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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff
(Wadsworth)

Ralph

L. Wadsworth

initiated

this

action

Construction

Company, Inc.

in district

court

seeking

injunctive relief or, alternatively, damages against Salt Lake
County (County).

Wadsworth was one of two construction companies

that submitted bid proposals in response to the County7s invitation
for bids for the work of constructing a county flood control
project.

Wadsworth, the unsuccessful bidder, alleged in its

complaint that the County improperly rejected its bid proposal as
non-responsive and awarded the contract to the other bidder, Gerber
Concrete Construction, Inc. (Gerber), in contravention of the terms
and conditions set forth in the Invitation to Bid.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

Wadsworth initially sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary

injunction

to

stop

the

County

and

Gerber

from

proceeding with the project (R. 52-55, 29-40). Wadsworth's motion
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985. At the hearing,
Wadsworth requested a "permanent injunction" (R. 176), and the
court initially ruled that it would grant a permanent injunction
2

against the County (R. 28) .

Following the hearing, Wadsworth

submitted a proposed order granting a permanent injunction which
contained findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 86-92) . The
County filed an objection to the proposed order, findings, and
conclusions (R. 67-70) together with a memorandum of law (R. 5666) . A hearing was held on the County/s objection on September 13,
1985, and the court subsequently reversed its earlier ruling and
entered an Order denying Wadsworth's motion for injunctive relief
(R. 97-98).
Following completion of the construction of the flood control
project by Gerber, the County filed a motion for summary judgment
and supporting memorandum (R. 110-125).

The motion was initially

heard and granted by the court on June 22, 1987 (R. 126-128).
Thereafter, Wadsworth filed a motion for relief from judgment and
rehearing (R. 131-135).

The County's motion for summary judgment

was reheard on June 29, 1987, at which time the court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part (R. 189-190) . The court ruled
that Wadsworth was no longer entitled to seek injunctive relief due
to mootness (the project having been completed) but could continue
to seek monetary damages against the County.
On July 12, 1989, Wadsworth filed a motion for summary
judgment, affidavit, and

supporting memorandum

(R.

224-284),

alleging that Wadsworth was entitled to recover damages in the
nature of lost profits under two separate theories, namely:

(1)

"breach of contract to award the project to Wadsworth" and (2)
"negligence in considering and rejecting Wadsworth's bid" (R. 225) .
3

The County filed a memorandum in opposition to Wadsworth's motion
(R. 331-357), together with six opposing affidavits (R. 289-330).
On

December

14,

1989, the

court

entered

its

order

granting

Wadsworth/s motion for summary judgment "as prayed." (R. 429-431)•
The County filed its notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court on January 12, 1990 (R. 434-435).

On April 24, 1990, the

Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of
Appeals for disposition.

The Court of Appeals heard oral argument

on May 30, 1991 and filed its Opinion on September

30, 1991,

vacating the summary judgment of the trial court and remanding the
case for further proceedings. On October 15, 1991, Wadsworth filed
a petition for rehearing, which was denied by the Court of Appeals
on December 17, 1991.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July of 1985, Salt Lake County invited bids for the work of
constructing a flood control project known as the Scott Avenue
Basin on Millcreek at 800 East, by issuing a public Invitation to
Bid to all licensed and qualified construction contractors (R. 2-3,
209) .
Prior to issuing the Invitation to Bid, the County contracted
with

an

independent

Engineering

consultant,

Eckhoff,

Watson

and

Preator

(Consultant), to assist the County in preparing bid

documents, advertising the project for bids, attending the bid
opening, reviewing the tabulation of bids, and advising the County
as to the proper action to be taken regarding the award of the
contract (R. 290-292).
4

The

County

designated

the

bidding

to

be

under

sealed

competitive public bidding and designated the date of July 29,
1985, at 11:30 a.m., as the time when all bids would be opened and
publicly read and an apparent low responsible bidder designated (R.
3, 209).
At the bid opening on July 29, 1985, the County, through its
designated representatives, opened the sealed bids of all bidders
on the project (R. 280) . The bid of each bidder was publicly read,
and Wadsworth was initially designated as the apparent low bidder
(R. 280) .

This was an initial designation and not a final

designation, being contingent upon the acceptance of the bid
proposal and the awarding of the contract by the board of county
commissioners (R. 280, 8).
The Consultant then tabulated and verified the bids received
on the project and on July 30, 1985 provided to the County a copy
of the Bid Tabulation, together with a letter containing the
Consultant's findings and recommendation (R. 290, 293-302).
In tabulating and verifying the bids, the Consultant found
that the bid proposals submitted by both Wadsworth and Gerber
contained minor extension errors (which were corrected by the
Consultant in the Bid Tabulation) , and that the apparent low bid
submitted by Wadsworth contained irregularities on the bid form
which made Wadsworth7s bid proposal non-responsive to the County's
invitation to bid (R. 293). In its letter, the Consultant stated:
The bid submitted by Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction
Company is not responsive to the invitation to bid
because it violated the Rules Governing Bids as outlined
in the Instructions to Bidders.
On Schedule D, two
5

prices were listed for Item 1 Basin Floodwalls and these
two prices were also listed in the subtotal for Schedule
D and the Bidding Schedule Summary. Of the two Total Bid
amounts listed, one was the apparent low bid, as stated
above, in the amount of $692,640.48 and the second bid
was the second low bid amount (behind Gerber's bid) in
the amount of 792,140.48. This represents an addition to
the bid form, an alternative proposal, and a modification
of the bid form which was not specifically called for in
the contract documents and may result in the County 7 s
rejection of the bid because it violated the rules of
bidding. (R. 293).
The

Consultant

made

the

following

recommendation

to the

County:
Based upon the irregularity of Wadsworth's bid and the
rules governing bidding, we recommend that the County
exercise it's right to reject it as not being responsive
and that the contract be awarded to Gerber Concrete
Construction. (R. 293) .
In the County's Invitation to Bid, the following rules were
included in the Instructions to Bidders under the Rules Governing
Bids:
1.3.03
Changes in or additions to the bid form,
recapitulations of the work bid upon, alternative
proposals, or any other modification of the bid form
which is not specifically called for in the contract
documents may result in the County's rejection of the bid
as not being responsive to the invitation.... (R. 9 ) .
1.3.04
The Board of County Commissioners reserves the
right to reject any and all proposals, and to waive any
informality in the proposal received. (R. 9 ) .
The Instructions to Bidders, under the heading "Preparation of
Bid," included the following instruction:
1.2.04
On the bidding schedule of the proposal form
the unit prices shall be written in ink or typed both in
words and numerals. In cases of discrepancy the amount
in words shall be construed to be the desired amount.
(R. 8 ) .
The

County's

Invitation

to
6

Bid

contained

the

following

statement on the Bidding Schedule Summary page:

"THE AWARD OF

CONTRACT, IF MADEf WILL BE TO THE LOWEST RESPONSIVE, RESPONSIBLE
BIDDER, PURSUANT TO COUNTY ORDINANCE." (R. 23).
On July 31, 1985, two days after the bid opening, Wadsworth
sent a letter to Neil Stack, a county employee, which stated: "This
letter

is to

clarify

referenced project."
that Wadsworth

had

some

confusion

concerning

(R. 439, exhibit 2).
inadvertently

our

bid

on

The letter indicated

forgotten

to

erase

certain

penciled-in figures, "thus causing some confusion as to which
number should be used." (R. 439, exhibit 2).
On August 14, 1985, the board of county commissioners held a
public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the bid proposals and
awarding

the

contract

(R.

268-270).

During

the

hearing,

Wadsworth's President, Ralph Wadsworth, stated his objections to
the contract being awarded to Gerber, arguing that the commission
has the right to waive any irregularities in a bid or to rebid the
project (R. 269).
In response, Thomas B. Larson, a deputy county attorney,
stated that although the bidding instructions allow the board to
waive any informality in a bid, the informality must not rise to
the degree that it makes the bid uncertain or ambiguous.

He

further stated that the bid submitted by Wadsworth contained two
different figures in the total price block, one in pencil and one
in ink; that the two total price figures submitted by Wadsworth
straddled the total price figure submitted by Gerber, one high and
one low; and that if there had been no other bidder within the high
7

to low range of Wadsworth's two figures, then Wadsworth could have
argued for the higher pencil price by requesting that the pencil
informality be waived.

He noted that the County has on occasion

waived the ink requirement and the requirement that all prices be
in writing as well as in numbers (R. 307-312).
After having reviewed the relevant bidding documents and
having

considered

the

statements

and

recommendations

of all

interested parties, the board of county commissioners voted to
award the contract to Gerber (R. 313-330).
The board determined that the bid proposal submitted by
Wadsworth was not acceptable for the following reasons:

(1) the

bid proposal form contained multiple entries in several places,
including two different figures in the box for the total bid price,
thus making the bid proposal ambiguous as to the total price; and
(2) the two different figures in the total bid price space in the
Wadsworth bid straddled the total bid price of the Gerber bid, thus
giving the Wadsworth bid a potentially unfair competitive advantage
by allowing Wadsworth to claim either figure as its intended bid
(R. 313-330).
Subsequent to the awarding of the contract to Gerber on August
14, 1985, Wadsworth took no action to protest the award until after
construction on the project had commenced, with the result that
considerable work had been completed by the time Wadsworth's motion
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was
heard by the district court on September 5, 1985 (R. 45, 163).
After this lawsuit was filed, the County took the depositions
8

of Ralph Wadsworth, Wadsworth's president, and Guy Wadsworth,
Wadsworth's general manager and estimator (R. 438 and 439).

They

testified that Guy Wadsworth had prepared Wadsworth's bid proposal
(deposition exhibit 1) and had then given it to Ralph Wadsworth to
sign and carry to the bid opening.

Twenty minutes before the bid

opening, Ralph Wadsworth called Guy Wadsworth on the telephone and
told him that he was worried about the bid because he hadn't seen
any other bidders and their bid was approximately $200,000.00 below
the engineer's estimate.

Ralph Wadsworth testified:

The engineer's estimate.
It was something like
$900,000. So, I asked him how the hell come ours was
$692,000, why we were so low.
And he said, That's the way it turned out. He
thought he was all right on them, but maybe he better
have another look at it. So, I told him I would call him
back. He better look and make sure he didn't make any
mistakes.
Then I said, Maybe you better give me a higher
figure to go in here in case I can't get you back or
something. What's the possibility of your error, if you
made an error or something? We discussed that, and we
arrived at $100,000.
And I asked him how many guys were bidding the job.
And he says there was a lot of bidders. And I said,
There are a lot? I haven't seen anybody yet. Is this
job more rough than you think it is? Because we never
had bid a job where there was one or two bidders in the
last five years. It seems like on County jobs, there are
eight or ten bidders.
So, I was worried about it. I was concerned that
since there wasn't a lot of bidders, maybe the job was a
lot more difficult than Guy had thought. And due to the
fact that we were $200,000 under the estimate, he better
look at it.
(R. 438, pp. 10-11). Following their telephone conversation, Ralph
Wadsworth wrote in the higher figures in pencil on the bid proposal
(R. 438, pp. 9-10).

Guy Wadsworth testified:

Q
Were the pencil figures just splitting the
difference between the estimate, the engineer's estimate,
9

and your figures?
A
Yes. We wanted to put a contingency number in
in case I had made a serious mistake. And the idea being
that he would get back to me after I had had a few
minutes to review it. If for some reason he couldn't get
through to me because of lack of an available phone or
whatever reason, we would have to take a chance on being
kicked out because of the bid being too high. But we
wanted to hedge our bets, I guess.
(R. 439, p. 7 ) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS
CASE DID NOT DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Plaintiff first alleges in its petition that review by writ of
certiorari should be granted in this case because the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision "that has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" as to call for
an exercise of the Supreme Court # s power of supervision.
In support of this allegation, plaintiff argues that:

"The

Court of Appeals' decision in this case fails to address or rule
upon the primary issues raised by Wadsworth."

This argument is

without merit. A review of the record clearly shows that the Court
of Appeals fully considered all of the relevant issues necessary to
support the Court's decision to vacate the summary judgment entered
by

the

district

court

and

to

remand

this

case

for

further

proceedings.
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS FULLY ADDRESSED WADSWORTH'S
ARGUMENTS PERTAINING TO WHETHER OR NOT A CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN THE COUNTY AND WADSWORTH.
10

Wadsworth contends that by submitting its bid proposal in
response to the County'&

invitation

for bids,

it created a

contractual relationship with the County, which the County then
breached by failing to accept Wadsworth's bid.

Wadsworth argues

that a "contract" was created and approved by the County Commission
when the Commission approved the bidding of the project under
county ordinances and the contract documents upon which bids were
required to be based (Plaintiff's Petition, pp. 10-11).
A review of the record in this case shows that this argument
was fully briefed for the Court of Appeals in the Brief of
Appellants, Brief of Appellee, and Reply Brief of Appellants. This
argument was also argued before the Court of Appeals during oral
argument.

This argument was, however, rejected by the Court of

Appeals in its Opinion.

Wadsworth thereafter filed its Petition

for Rehearing and reasserted this same argument, which was again
considered and rejected by the Court of Appeals.
In determining whether there was a contractual relationship
between the County and Wadsworth in this case, the Court of Appeals
correctly applied the rule and test previously established by this
Court in the case of Rapp v. Salt Lake City. 527 P.2d 651 (Utah
1974) . In Rapp, this Court held that an advertisement for bids is
not itself an offer, rather the bid is the offer which creates no
rights until accepted. The Court further ruled that, particularly
in the case of public contracts, the requirement of certain
formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates that even
after acceptance of the bid, there is still no contract until there
11

has been compliance with the requisite formalities.

527 P.2d, at

654.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals correctly determined
that the requisite formalities under applicable county ordinances
had not been met, and that, as a result, no contract was created
that would give Wadsworth any contractual rights.
The Court of Appeals recognized and specifically noted that in
this case, the Board of County Commissioners did not approve
Wadsworth's bid, but in fact, rejected it before any work was
commenced on the project, and that Wadsworth failed to present any
evidence of any binding contract created or expressly authorized by
any ordinance or resolution adopted by the Board.
602.

818 P.2d, at

Thus, the Court fully considered and addressed Wadsworth7s

arguments pertaining to whether or not a contract existed between
the County and Wadsworth.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE RULES OF LAW
ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN THE RAPP CASE.
Wadsworth contends in its petition that the Court of Appeals
did not address Wadsworth's argument that "...the Rapp decision is
clearly distinguishable from the present case in that different
legal issues were presented."

(Plaintiff's Petition, p. 12).

Contrary to Wadsworth's assertions, the decision by this Court
in the Rapp case addressed the same legal issue which is presented
in the instant case.
In Rapp, this Court specifically addressed the issue of
whether a bid proposal submitted in response to an invitation to
12

bid for a public construction contract creates any contractual
relationship, either express or implied, between the bidder and the
public authority.

The Court concluded that it did not.

In the Rapp case, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for
expenses he incurred in preparing and submitting a bid to construct
a building at the Salt Lake City International Airport.

The

plaintiff protested the City's award of the contract to the
successful bidder on the grounds that the action of the City was
not taken in good faith and that the City had failed to disclose to
the bidders that a competitive advantage had been granted to the
successful bidder.

The City filed a motion for summary judgment,

which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to
recover damages on several theories, all of which were rejected by
this Court.

The first theory plaintiff argued was breach of

contract, contending that he had "a collateral implied in fact
contract" which was breached by the City:
Plaintiff urges that in a bidding situation two distinct
contracts are involved. Under the first contract, since
the governmental entity might reject all bids, the
solicitation of bids is not a promise to accept the
lowest or best bid; plaintiff concedes that the bid is a
mere offer which must be accepted and all statutory
formalities fulfilled prior to the existence of a binding
contract. He insists that there is a second, collateral
contract under which the government by soliciting bids
impliedly promises to give fair consideration to all of
the competitive bids and this promise is supported by the
time, effort, and expense in so preparing the bid.
(Emphasis added.)
527 P.2d, at 654.
there was

any

This Court rejected plaintiff's argument that

implied

contract
13

between

the

bidder

and

the

government. After first explaining the distinction between express
and implied in fact contracts, the Court stated thctt there could be
no contractual liability, express or implied, binding upon the City
until the requirements of a writing and sanction of the board of
commissioners had been complied with:
[1] An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not
itself an offer, rather the bid or the tender is an offer
which creates no right until accepted. Particularly in
the case of public contracts, the requirements of certain
formalities by law, such as a written contract, indicates
that even after acceptance of the bid, there is no
contract until there has been compliance with the
requisite formalities. (Emphasis added.)
527 P.2d, at 654. The Court then held that the City's invitation
to

bid

and

the

plaintiff's

response

thereto

could

not

be

interpreted as "a manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain"
out of which a binding contract could arise:
[2] The invitation to bid by the City may not be
interpreted as an offer for a binding contract; this
action and plaintiff's response may not be reasonably
construed as a manifestation of mutual assent indicating
an intention of the parties to be bound by a contract,
the terms of which were certain.
Additionally,
plaintiff's theory must fail since no contractual
liability can be created without compliance with the
previously cited ordinances.
527 P.2d, at 654.
Applying the rules established by this Court in the Rapp
decision to the facts of the present case, there was no contract
between the County and Wadsworth. The invitation of the County to
bid and Wadsworth's response cannot be reasonably interpreted as a
"manifestation of mutual assent to make a bargain, the terms of
which were certain."

First, the County's Invitation to Bid was

expressly conditioned upon the acceptance of the proposal and the
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awarding of the contract by the board of county commissioners.
Thus, there could be no "manifestation of mutual assent to make a
bargain" prior to the occurrence of that condition.

Second, the

County's ordinances, like the City's ordinances relied upon by the
Court in the Rapp case, provide that no contract shall be binding
on the County unless it is reduced to writing and approved by the
board of county commissioners:
Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize
the making of all contracts to which the county may be a
party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf of
or be binding on the county unless it is entered into by
ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and
approved by the commission, or expressly authorized by
ordinance or resolution. No such ordinance or resolution
shall be passed until it has remained on file at least
one week.
The Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966 as amended,
section 1-2-9. Therefore, as recognized by the Court of Appeals in
its Opinion, there could be no contract between the County and
Wadsworth until there had been compliance with the requisite
formalities of an ordinance or resolution or contract reduced to
writing and approved by the commission.

In the absence of the

required formalities, there was no contract between the County and
Wadsworth.

As a result, there could be no breach of contractual

duties by the County.
Wadsworth also contends that "In the present case, the
Invitation for Bids was much more than an ordinary invitation or
advertisement for bids."

(Plaintiff's Petition, p. 13). However,

Wadsworth has never presented any evidence establishing what an
"ordinary" invitation or advertisement is or is not. In fact, the
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County's invitation for bids is quite ordinary and contains the
same provisions for bid bonds and other obligations as do the
invitations

for

bids

issued

by

most

municipalities in the State of Utah.

state

agencies

and

This point is conceded by

Wadsworth in its petition, where it states:

"Salt Lake County, as

well as most state agencies and municipalities in the State of
Utah, impose important obligations on public bidding contractors to
hold bids open for specified time periods, to provide bid bonds to
guarantee the contractor will perform

if the

low bidder, and

provisions for contractual liquidated damages for withdrawing a low
bid

and

refusing

to

perform

the

work

for

the

bid

amount."

(Plaintiff's Petition, p. 17).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
that the County's invitation for bids was not an offer. Rather, it
was only an invitation for offers, and Wadsworth's bid proposal was
the offer.

The fact that Wadsworth's offer contained a promise to

hold its bid open for sixty days and provide a bid bond does not
change Wadsworth's bid proposal from an offer into an acceptance.
This is a basic and fundamental concept in the area of public
construction

contracts,

and

the

Court

of

Appeals

correctly

determined that "...no contract was created, express or implied,
that would give Wadsworth contractual rights."

818 P.2d, at 602.

C.
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO ADDRESS
IN ITS OPINION ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES.
Wadsworth contends that the Court of Appeals failed to address
in its opinion certain issues raised by the parties on appeal.
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While it is true that the Opinion of the Court of Appeals does not
address all of the issues raised by the parties on appeal, it is
not improper for an appellate court to decide a case based upon
certain dispositive issues and, as a result, not reach all of the
other issues raised by the parties.
A review of the appellate briefs filed in the Court of Appeals
in this case shows that there were certain issues that were not
reached by the Court in its Opinion, such as whether the Board of
County Commissioners was justified in rejecting Wadsworth's bid as
non-responsive to its invitation for bids.

However, it was not

necessary for the Court to address all such issues raised by the
parties, because the Court found sufficient narrower grounds on
which to vacate the summary judgment entered by the district court
and remand the case for further proceedings.
The only remedy sought by Wadsworth in its motion for summary
judgment was damages in the nature of anticipated lost profits.
And the only theories of liability asserted in its motion for
summary judgment were breach of contract and negligence. Thus, it
was only necessary for the Court of appeals to consider these
limited issues, and no others, in deciding to vacate the summary
judgment and remanding this case for further proceedings.
As noted by the Court in footnote 4 of its opinion, it had no
occasion to consider the issue of whether Wadsworth might be
entitled to monetary damages in the nature of bid preparation
costs, because Wadsworth did not seek this remedy in its motion for
summary judgment in the district court.
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Similarly, the Court of Appeals had no reason to address, and
did not address, such issues as whether a wrongfully

rejected

bidder would be entitled to recover monetary dcimages or obtain
other relief under more appropriate theories of liability such as
abuse of discretion, fraud, collusion, or other misconduct on the
part of the awarding authority, because these issues were not
included in Wadsworth's limited motion for summary judgment.
POINT II.
IN DECIDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES IN
THE NATURE OF LOST PROFITS UNDER CONTRACT OR NEGLIGENCE
THEORIES, THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE ANY
IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR STATE LAW WHICH HAVE
NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THE SUPREME COURT.
Wadsworth contends in its petition that if the decision of the
Court of Appeals is allowed to stand, then "The integrity of the
bidding system will be destroyed."

(Plaintiff's Petition, p. 18).

If this contention were true, then it would be a serious
situation indeed.

However, the truth is that the decision of the

Court of Appeals is based upon longstanding precedent, established
by this Court and others; and the effect of the decision is simply
to preserve

the

status

quo

and

the

present

effectiveness

of

competitive bidding laws in this state, which have evolved through
the years by statute, ordinance, and common law decisions.
Contrary to Plaintiff's dire prediction of the imminent demise
of the public competitive bidding system in the State of Utah as a
direct result of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the decision
of the Court of Appeals will serve primarily to strengthen the
competitive bidding system and "...the very public interest that
18

the competitive bidding laws were designed to protect." 818 P.2d,
at 602.
Plaintiff argues that the question of whether a wrongfully
rejected bidder on a public construction project is entitled to any
monetary relief (presumably under any theory of liability), is an
important question of municipal and state law which should be
decided by the Supreme Court.
However, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, this
broad

issue was not before the Court

in the present case.

Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment only sought to establish
liability under the theories of breach of contract and negligence.
Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment did not pursue liability
under the usual and accepted theories of liability in public
bidding cases, such as abuse of discretion, fraud, collusion, or
other misconduct on the part of the awarding authority. Similarly,
Wadsworth's motion for summary judgment only pursued monetary
damages in the nature of anticipated lost profits, and not other
monetary damages such as bid preparation costs.1
As a result, the Court of Appeals appropriately declined to
address these issues which were neither properly before it nor
necessary for its decision.

The Court of Appeals decided all

questions and issues actually before it in accordance with the
precedents established by this Court.

1

See Annotation, Public Contracts:
Low Bidders Monetary
Relief against State or Local Agency for Nonaward of Contract, 65
A.L.R.4th 93 (1988) and other authorities cited in footnote 3 of
the Opinion of the Court of Appeals.
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CONCLUSION
In vacating the summary judgment of the district court and
remanding this case for further proceedings, the Court of Appeals
fully addressed and considered all relevant arguments raised by the
parties on appeal. While it is true that the Opinion of the Court
of Appeals does not address all of the issues raised by the parties
on appeal, it is not improper for an appellate court to decide a
case based upon certain dispositive issues and, as a result,

not

reach all of the other issues raised by the parties. In rendering
its decision, the Court did not depart from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings so as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision.
In deciding that plaintiff Wadsworth was not entitled to
damages in the nature of lost profits under contract or negligence
theories, the Court of Appeals did not decide any important
questions of municipal or state law which have not already been
settled by the Supreme Court.
For the reasons stated above, defendants respectfully
request that the Court deny plaintiff's petition for writ of
certiorari.
Dated this ///^

day of February, 1992.
DAVID E. YOCOM
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

S
ytf^tf/fREtf H THORPE
V _ / Deputy County A t t o r n e y

Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Jeffrey H. Thorpe, certify that on the
day of
February, 1992, I mailed four copies of the attached Respondents'
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Beesley
& Fairclough, counsel for the appellee in this matter, postage
prepaid, at the following address:
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
300 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee

21

APPENDIX
1.

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing

2.

Opinion of the Court of Appeals

3.

Summary Judgment of the District Court

4.

Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1966
as amended, section 1-2-9 and section 18-1-1,
et seq.

FBiUED
DEC 171991
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction

iYJar-T Nocnsn
ORDER DENY$&^ «' T h e J o u r t
PETITION FOR RBfiEARTNtS * P P e a , s

Company, Inc,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 900234-CA

Salt Lake County, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah;
R. P. Holdsworth, Director, The
Salt Lake County Flood Control
Division,
Defendants and Appellants.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed October 15, 1991,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this

, ^(-^
1

FOR THE COURT:

day of December, 1991.

V."

V-t

DEC 1 Mary T/Noonan
ClerioZf^-the Court

l,

' i .

r/:i

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of December, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail to the parties
listed below:
David E. Yocom
Salt Lake County Attorney
Jeffrey H. Thorpe
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, Suite S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200
Wilford A. Beesley
Stanford P. Fitts
Beesley & Fairclough
Attorneys at Law
310 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dated this 17th day of December, 1991.

Deputy CWrk

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction
Company, Inc.,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 900234-CA
v.
Salt Lake County, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah; R. P. Holdsworth,
Director, The Salt Lake County
Flood Control Division,

FILED
(September 30, 1991)

Defendants and Appellants,

SEP 3 0 J991

CAM,
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable James S. Sawaya
Attorneys:

NHKV/T Nconan
Clerk c* :•* Court
UtattCou.; or Appeals
D a v i d E . Y o c o m a n d J e f f r e y H . T h o r p e , S a l t L a k e City,

for Appellant
Wilford A. Beesley and Stanford P. Fitts, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. (Wadsworth)
was the unsuccessful bidder on a public works proJ€*ct in Salt
Lake County (the County) and sued for damages on contract and
negligence theories. The trial court awarded Wadsworth damages
for lost profits on a motion for summary judgment and the County
appealed. We reverse and remand.
I.

FACTS

On July 8, 1985, the County invited competitive, sealed bids
by advertisement for construction of the Scott Avenue Basin flood
control project on Millcreek. The bid advertisement
contained
instructions and rules governing the bid.1 Wadsworth received
1. The bid instructions required unit prices to be written in
ink or typed both in words and numerals. The instructions
(continued...)

the bid advertisement and, along with Gerber Concrete
Construction, Inc. (Gerber) , bid the project. When the bids were
opened and the figures read publicly, Wadsworth was designated as
the apparent low bidder, pending final approval by the County
Board of Commissioners (the Board).
The County consulting engineers subsequently reviewed the
bids and discovered irregularities in Wadsworth1s bid. In
addition to minor computation errors that could be corrected,
Wadsworth1s bid contained a six digit figure that had been
penciled in above another number written in ink for the cost of
the line item "basin floodwall." Both numbers were added to
other line items in separate calculations of the subtotal for the
concrete floodwalls. Two different numbers appeared, one in pen
and one in ink, in the subtotal column on the bid schedule. The
pencil and ink figures from the subtotal column on the bid
schedule were again listed in the summary of subtotals and
entered in the box for the total bid price. The figures
reflected substantial price differences.
Wadsworth1s total high
1
and low figures straddled Gerber s total bid price. The
consultants recommended that the Board reject Wadsworth's bid as
not responsive to the bid request.
On August 14, 1985, the Board held a public hearing to
review the bid proposals. At the hearing, Wadsworth argued the
Board could waive the irregularities. Wadsworth had previously
sent a letter to the County shortly after bids were opened to
clarify the "confusion as to which number should be used." A
county attorney advised against waiver, and the Board rejected
Wadsworth's bid as not responsive and awarded the contract to
Gerber. Wadsworth then sought to enjoin Gerber from starting
construction by filing suit in district court, but the court
allowed the work to go forward.
When the flood control project was completed, the County
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the equitable
relief Wadsworth sought had been rendered moot and that Wadsworth
was not entitled to the damages requested. The court granted the
motion in part and denied injunctive relief, but ruled that
Wadsworth could seek damages for wrongful rejection of its bid.
Wadsworth then moved for summary judgment and was awarded damages
for lost profits on contract and negligence theories. The County
appealed.

1. (...continued)
expressly prohibited erasure, interlineation or other correction
unless such corrections were authenticated by the signature of
the person signing the bid.
900234-CA
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Thomock v. Cook. 604
P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). Because disposition of a case by
summary judgment denies the benefit of trial on the merits, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing
party. Reeves v. Geiov Pharmaceutical, Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 640
(Utah App. 1988). Moreover, because summary judgment is granted
as a matter of law, we are free to reappraise the legal
conclusion of the trial court. Luckv Seven Rodeo Core, v. Clark.
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988).
III.
A.

REJECTION OF THE BID
Contractual Theory

The issue of whether an unsuccessful bidder on a public
works project is entitled to contractual damages was decided in
Rapp v. Salt Lake Citv> 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974). In Rapp. the
supreme court denied recovery of damages by an aggrieved bidder
under either express or implied contract theories. Id. at 655.
"An ordinary advertisement for a bid is not itself an offer," the
court reasoned, "rather the bid or tender is an offer which
creates no rights until accepted." £d. at 654. The supreme
court also acknowledged that, pursuant to ordinance, formal
acceptance by the governing authority was required to create a
binding contract. Id.
In the present case, the Board is empowered by ordinance to
make contracts on behalf of the County. No contract is binding
on the County, however, until it has been2 approved by the Board
or authorized by ordinance or resolution.
In this case, the
Board did not approve Wadsworth's bid, but in fact, rejected it
before any work was commenced on the project. Therefore, no
contract was created, either express or implied, that would give
Wadsworth contractual rights. Accordingly, damages for

2. Salt Lake County, Utah, Code of Ordinances, § 2.04.100
(1990).
The commission shall make or authorized [sic] the
making of all contracts to which the county may be a
party, and no contract shall be entered into on behalf
of or be binding on the county unless it is reduced to
writing and approved by the commission, or expressly
authorized by ordinance or resolution.
Wadsworth presents no argument that a binding contract was
created by ordinance or resolution. Accordingly, we do not
address either of those provisions of the ordinance.
900234-CA
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anticipated lost profits were inappropriate under either express
or implied contract theories.
B.

Negligence Theory

The issue of whether a contractor who is the apparent low
bidder on a public works contract is entitled to recover damages
for lost profits for wrongful rejection of its bid is a case of
first impression in Utah. A substantial majority of the
jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue have not allowed an
aggrieved low bidder to recover damages for the failure of a
public body to award a contract.3 We adopt the majority
approach and hold that damages for lost profits are not
recoverable
under negligence theory as a matter of Utah common
law.4
The rationale for our holding is that the laws governing
competitive bidding are enacted for the benefit of the general
taxpaying public and not individual bidders. See Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Clark County, 94 Nev. 116, 575 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1978). A
violation of those laws, therefore, is a breach of a duty owed to
the public and not to an individual. Because damages benefit
only the interest of an individual bidder, an award of damages
for lost profits in such instances is contrary to the very public
interest that the competitive bidding laws were designed to
3. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App. 480, 556 P.2d
328 (1976); Klinaer v. Citv of Favetteville. 297 Ark. 385, 762
S.W.2d 388 (1988); Rubino v. Lolli, 10 Cal.App.3d 1059, 89
Cal.Rptr. 320 (1970); Sutter Bros. Constr. Co. Inc. v. Citv of
Leavenworth. 238 Kan. 85, 708 P.2d 190 (1985); Baker v. State.
707 P.2d 20 (Mont. 1985); Gulf Oil Corn, v. Clark County, 94 Nev.
116, 575 P.2d 1332 (1978); M. A. Stephen Constr. Co. v. Borough
of Rumson, 125 N.J.Super. 67, 308 A.2d 380, cert, denied, 64 N.J.
315, 315 A.2d 404 (1973); R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. School District of
Citv of York, 400 Pa. 391, 162 A.2d 623 (1960); Mottner v. Town
of Mercer Island, 75 Wash.2d 575, 452 P.2d 750 (1969). £££ also
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 29.86 (3rd
Ed. 1990); Annotation, Public Contracts: Low Bidder's Monetary
Relief against State or Local Aaencv for Nonaward of Contract, 65
A.L.R.4th 93 (1988); 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works and Contracts §
86 (1972).
4. Since Wadsworth did not seek to recover its bid preparation
costs, we have no occasion to consider the issue. See Heyer
Products Co., Inc. v. United States, 135 Ct. CI. 63, 140 F.Supp.
409 (1956)(unsuccessful bidder may recover bid preparation costs
where bids are not invited in good faith). We also note, in
passing, that counties are not included within the scope of the
Utah Procurement Code and the remedies therein provided. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-56-2, -5(12), -5(25), -47 (1989).
900234-CA
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protect. In addition, damages for lost profits further burden
the public coffers already penalized by paying a higher price for
goods or services. See City of Scottsdale v. Deem. 27 Ariz.App.
480, 556 P.2d 328, 330 (1976).
IV.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that Wadsworth was not entitled to damages for
lost profits under either contract or negligence theories. We
therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Gregory K. Onne, Judge

900234-CA
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RALPH L. WADSWORTH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
Civil No. C-85-5681

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah; R. P. HOLDSWORTH,
DIRECTOR, THE SALT LAKE COUNTY
FLOOD CONTROL DIVISION,

judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.
The

Motion

of plaintiff - Ralph

L. Wadsworth

Construction

Company, inc. for Summary Judgment came on regularly before the
above

entitled

Court

on November

Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding.

20, 1989 at 2:00

p.m.,

the

Plaintiff was represented by

Wilford A. Beesley, Esq. and Stanford P. Fitts, Esq. and defendants
were represented by Jeffrey H. Thorpe, Esq.

The Court, having

considered the memoranda submitted and arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND
DECREES:

1

C04?S

1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff Ralph L.

Wadsworth Construction Company, Inc. is hereby gramted as prayed.
2. Defendants were required to award the subject construction
project to the low, responsive, responsible-bidder.
3.

Plaintiff was the low, responsive, responsible bidder on

the subject project and defendants should have awarded the project
to plaintiff.
4.
care

Defendants breached contractual duties and duties of due

owing

to

plaintiff

in

rejecting

plaintiff's

bid

as

nonresponsive.
5. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants and each
of them in the amount of $62,344.15 together with plaintiff's costs
incurred in this matter and prejudgment interest at the statutory
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from March 27, 1987 until the
date of judgment.
6.

Plaintiff is entitled to post judgment interest at the

statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) per annua from the date of
this Judgment until paid in full.
Dated this

day of December, 1989.

ies S. Sawa^a"
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/

1777,
rft \. Thiols', Esq.
CO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this _ J ^ _ a a y of
December, 1989:
Jeffery H. Thorpe
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1.2-1—1-2-4

ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCES
Chapter 2
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Sections:
1-2-1.
1-2-2.
1-2-3.
1-2-4.
1-2-5.
1-2-6.
1-2-7.
1-2-8.
1-2-9.

County Commission — Number — Eligibility
Term of Office
Vacancies — How Filled
Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision
Departments
Meetings
Special Meetings
Chairman — Quorum — May Administer Oaths
Contracts

Sec 1-2-1. County Commission — Number — Eligibility. The Salt
Lake County Commission shall consist of three members, each of whom
shall have been an elector of the county for at least one year immediately
preceding the election and elected by the qualified, electors of the county
at large.
Sec 1-2-2. Term of Office. County commissioners shall be elected at
the general election next preceding the expiration of the term of office
of incumbents; one for a term of four years and one for a term of two
years, and each shall hold office for the term for which elected and until
a successor is elected and has qualified.
Sea 1-2-3. Vacancies — How Filled. Whenever a vacancy occurs in
the board of county commissioners through ineligibility, resignation or
death of the incumbent or of the officer elect before qualifying, or through
refusal to act, or for any other reason, the board must fill the vacancy
by appointment. Should the board fail to make the appointment within
thirty days after the vacancy occurs, the clerk shall notify the governor
of the fact, and the governor shall within thirty days after receipt of notice
fill the vacancy by appointment. If at any time there shall not be a majority of the board remaining in office, the governor «h«H appoint one
or two commissioners as the case may be until there shall be a majority,
and the majority shall select the third as herein provided. Appointees
shall hold office for the unexpired term. Any appointment under the provisions of this section must be made from a list of at least six persons
who have been endorsed in writing by the central county committee of
the party to which the person belonged who occasioned the vacancy.
Sec 1-2-4. Powers and Duties — Omnibus Provision. The county commission shall be the legislative division of county government and may
supervise the official conduct of all county and department officers and
6

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

1-2-5—1-2-8

officers of all precincts, districts and other subdivisions of the county (except
municipal corporations), and shall see that they faithfully perform their
duties, direct prosecutions for delinquencies, and, when necessary, require
them to renew their official bond, make reports and present their books and
accounts for inspection. The commission shall have such other powers and
duties as are prescribed by law.
Sec. 1-2-5. Departments. Each commissioner shall have the supervision of
such departments and boards of county government as lend themselves to
joint classification and each department or board shall bear such title and
designation as the board of county commissioners shall from time to time
devise, provided, that said title shall, as nearly as possible, represent the true
nature of those functions performed by the officers and employees of such
department or board.
Sec. 1-2-6. Meetings. The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, shall hold three regular public meetings in each and
every week during the year in the Commission Chambers in the City and
County Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, which meetings shall be held on
Monday and Wednesday at the hour often o'clock A.M., and Thursday at nine
o'clock A.M., except that in case any of such days falls upon a holiday, said
meeting shall be deemed adjourned until the next succeeding meeting date as
aforesaid, provided, however, that the time of said meetings may be changed
or altered to any other time on the same day by the vote of at least two (2)
members of the said Board, duly entered into the minutes of any preceding
meeting thereof; and provided further, that any meeting of the said Board
may be recessed, once convened, to any other time, place or day prior to the
next succeeding regular meeting. Any regularly scheduled meeting may be
cancelled in advance by a vote of any two members of said Board taken at a
duly convened regular meeting, in the event there will be no business to
transact or when it is known in advance a quorum cannot be obtained.
(Amended 5/29/75.)

Sec. 1-2-7. Special Meetings. Special meetings may be called by any two
commissioners or by the chairman upon a five-day notice to any absent
commissioner and upon entry into the minutes of the board of an order signed
by the members or chairman calling such meeting, provided, that the
requirement of a notice shall not be binding in any special meeting at which all
of the members of the commission are present and effectively waive such
requirement.
It shall be the duty of the county clerk when given copies of such notices
to serve or cause the same to be served immediately.
The order must specify the business to be transacted at such special
meeting and none other than that specified shall be transacted thereat unless
all members of the commission are present and consent thereto.
Sec. 1-2-8. Chairman — Quorum — May Administer Oaths. County commissioners shall elect one of their members chairman to preside at all meetings of the board. In case of the chairman's absence or inability to act, the
(Printed 6/30/80)
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1.2.9-1.3-1

members present must, by an order entered in their minutes, select one of
their members to act as chairman temporarily. Any member of the board may
administer oaths to any person when necessary in the performance of his
official duties. Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business, and no act of the board shall be valid or binding unless
two members concur therein.
Sec. 1*2-9. Contracts. The commission shall make or authorize the making
of all contracts to which the county may be a party, and no contract shall be
entered into on behalf of or be binding on the county unless it is entered into
by ordinance or resolution or is reduced to writing and approved by the
commission, or expressly authorized by ordinance or resolution. No such
ordinance or resolution shall be passed until it has remained on file at least
one week.
Chapter 3
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Sections:
1-3-1.
1-3-2.
1-3-3.
1-3-4.
1-3-5.
1-3-6.
1-3-7.
1-3-8.
1-3-9.

Purpose
Administrative Classifications • Employment of
Administrative Personnel
Administrative Services
Human Services
Public Works
Limitation
Executive Council
Steering Council
Policies and Procedures

Sec. 1-3-1. Purpose. It is the intent of the board of county commissioners
to organize the executive department of county government in a manner
designed to provide service delivery to the public in an efficient and
coordinated manner. Certain of the divisions, boards and commissions
described in this chapter have statutory duties and contractual prerogatives
independent of authority delegated by the board of county commissioners and
it is not the intent of the board to preempt, abrogate or diminish such
authority. Neither are the functional descriptions meant to be exhaustive of
the duties assigned and delegated to the respective organizational
subdivisions. However, it is deemed necessary by the board of county
commissioners to include all subdivisions of government within a single
management structure for purposes of effective administration and
coordination. Further, all county executive authority not expressly granted
by law or interlocal agreement to other officers, boards or commissions is
reserved to the board of county commissioners acting jointly, severally or
through its administrative designees and the exercise of such authority is
subject to the board'sfinalapproval and direction.
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Chapter 1

PURCHASING PROCEDURES
Sections:
18-1-1.
18-1-2.
18-1-3.
18-1-4.
18-1-5.
18-1-6.
18-1-7.
18-1-8.

Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids
Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids
Emergency Contracts
Requisition Agents
Advertisements for Bids — Deposits
Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition
Opening of Bids
Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or Contract
— Public Inspection
18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination
18-1-10. Rejection of Bids
18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders
18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts

Sec. 18-1-1. Purchase Orders and Contracts — Competitive Bids. Except
as otherwise herein provided, all county purchase orders and contracts of
every kind, involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00, for labor and services,
or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property, materials, equipment
or supplies, shall be let by competitive bidding after advertisement, to the
lowest responsible bidder, or in the appropriate instance, to the highest
responsible bidder, depending upon whether the county is to expend or to
receive the money.
All purchase orders or contracts less than $5,000.00, and in excess of
$300.00, shall be let in the open market in a manner calculated to insure the
best interests of the public and after solicitation of bids by mail, telephone or
otherwise. All bids in excess of $1,000.00 shall be in writing. Unless otherwise
authorized-by the board of county commissioners, the purchasing agent shall
obtain at least three competitive bids.
The commission may waive the above requirements at such time as the
public good justifies such action and shall not be prohibited by the terms of
this section from awarding contracts or purchase orders without
advertisement or other solicitation if the item to be procured is a brand-name
type product which can be procured from only one source. Any department,
office, board or other agency of the county desiring to requisition a
brand-name type product which would require a waiver of the bidding
requirements in this section must submit a letter of justification to the
purchasing agent which must specify why the brand-name type product is
required and set forth the reasons why normal bidding requirements should
be waived. No contract or purchase order in excess of $500.00 may be awarded
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for such brand-name type product without the approval of the commission.
The purchasing agent must, in the performance of his duties, comply with
the requirements specified in 17-15-3 U.C.A. 1953.
Sec. 18*1-2. Contracts Not Requiring Competitive Bids. Contracts which
by their nature are not adapted to award by competitive bidding, such as
contracts for the services of individuals possessing a high degree of professional skill, where the ability orfitnessof the individual plays an important
part, contracts for the printing of finance committee pamphlets, auditor's
estimates and departmental reports, contracts for the printing or engraving
of bonds, water certificates, tax warrants and other evidences of
indebtedness, contracts for utility services such as water, light, heat,
telephone and telegraph, and contracts for the purchase of magazines, books,
periodicals, and similar articles of an educational or instructional nature, shall
not be subject to the competitive bidding requirements of this ordinance. The
purchasing agent is expressly authorized to procure from any federal, state or
local unit, or agency thereof, such materials, supplies, commodities or their
equivalent, as may be made available through the operation of any legislation,
without conforming to the competitive bidding requirements of this chapter.
Regular employment contracts in the service of the county, whether with
respect to classified service which may be later enacted, or otherwise, shall
not be subject to the provisions of this chapter, nor shall this chapter be
applicable to the granting or issuance, pursuant to powers conferred by laws,
ordinances or resolutions, of franchises, licenses, permits or other
authorizations by the corporate authorities of the municipality, or by
departments, offices, institutions, boards, commissions, agencies or other
instrumentalities of the county.
Sec. 18-1 -3. Emergency Contracts. In case of an emergency affecting the
public health or safety, the Salt Lake County Commission may, at a duly
convened meeting, unanimously require, without public advertisement, that
contracts be let to the extent necessary to resolve such emergency. The
resolution or ordinance permitting such action shall fix the date upon which
such emergency shall terminate, provided that such date may be extended or
abridged by the commission as circumstances require.
The purchasing agent, or any agency of the county authorized in writing
by the purchasing agent, may, subject to the approval of the board of county
commissioners, purchase in the open market without filing a requisition for
estimate, and without advertisement, supplies, materials or equipment in an
amount not exceeding $10,000.00. A full written account of any such
emergency, together with a requisition for the materials, supplies or
equipment which it required, shall be submitted immediately to the
purchasing agent and shall be open to public inspection for a period of at least
one year subsequent to the date of the emergency purchase.
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Sec. 18-1-4. Requisition Agents. Each major department, office, board or
other agency of the county shall certify in writing to the purchasing agent the
names of such officers or employees as shall be authorized to sign requests for
purchases for such agency, and all such requests for purchases shall be void
unless executed by such certified officers or employees and approved by the
purchasing agent.
Except as to emergency contracts, no undertaking involving amounts in
excess of $5,000.00 shall be split into parts by any concerned party so as to
produce amounts of $5,000.00 or less, for the purpose of avoiding the
provisions of this ordinance.
Sec. 18-1-5. Advertisements for Bids — Deposits. All proposals to award
purchase orders or contracts involving amounts in excess of $5,000.00 shall be
published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation published in Salt
Lake County. The board of county commissioners may reject any an all bids
for any valid reason. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
prohibit the purchasing agent from placing additional announcements in
recognized trade journals. Advertisements for bids shall describe the
character of the proposed contract or agreement in sufficient detail to enable
prospective bidders to know what their obligations will be. The description
may be made either in the advertisement itself, or by reference to detailed
plans and specifications on file at the time of the publication of the first
announcement. The advertisement shall state the date, time and place
assigned for the opening of bids, and no bids shall be received at any time
subsequent to the time indicated in the announcement. An extension of time
may, however, be granted for the opening of such bids upon publication in ?
newspaper of general circulation throughout Salt Lake County of the date tc
which the bid opening has been extended. The time for the opening of the
extended bid shall be not less than 10 days after the publication thereof,
Sundays and legal Holidays excluded.
Cash, a cashier's check, a certified check or a comptroller's certificate of
monies owed the particular vendor, as a deposit of good faith, in a reasonable
amount, but not in excess of 10% of the contract amount, may be required of
each bidder by the purchasing agent on all bids involving amounts in excess of
$5,000.00.
Sec. 18-1-6. Collusion Among Bidders and Disclosures — Prohibition.
Any agreement or collusion among bidders or prospective bidders, to bid a
fixed price shall render the bids of such bidders void. Each bidder shall
accompany his bid with a sworn statement that he has not been a party to any
such agreement. Any disclosure made or permitted by the purchasing agent
in advance of the opening of bids, of the terms of the bids submitted in
response to an advertisement, shall render the entire proceeding void and
shall require re-advertisement and re-award.
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Sec. 18-1-7. Opening of Bids. All sealed bids shall be publicly opened by
the purchasing agent or by an officer or employee in the office of the
purchasing agent who is duly authorized in writing by the purchasing agent to
open such bids.
Sec. 18-1-8. Awarding of Contracts — Filing of Purchase Order or
Contract — Public Inspection. The award of any contract involving amounts
in excess of $5,000.00 shall be made by the board of county commissioners to
the lowest or highest responsible bidders meeting specifications as provided
in section 18-1-5 above. Each bid, with the name of the bidder, shall be
entered on a record, which record, with the name of the successful bidder
indicated thereon, shall after award of the contract or purchase order, be
open to public inspection in the office of the purchasing agent.
All purchase orders or contracts involving amounts of $5,000.00 or less
shall be awarded by the purchasing agent to the lowest or highest responsible
bidders as provided in section 18-1-1 above and shall be signed by the
purchasing agent and submitted to the commission for approval and
ratification.
An official copy of each awarded purchase order or contract, together
with all necessary attachments, including assignments and written consents
of the purchasing agent, shall be retained by the purchasing agent in an
appropriate file open to the public for such period of time after termination of
the contract as an action against the county might ensue under applicable
statutes of limitations. After such period, purchase orders, contracts and
attachments may be destroyed by direction of purchasing agent.
Sec. 18-1-9. Responsibility of Bidders — Determination. In determining
the responsibility of any bidder, the commission may take into account other
factors in addition to financial responsibility, such as past records or
transactions with the bidder, experience, adequacy of equipment, ability to
complete performance within a specified time limit and other pertinent considerations.
Sec. 18-1-10. Rejection of Bids. Any and all bids received in response to
an advertisement may be rejected by the board of county commissioners if the
bidder is not deemed responsible, or the character or quality of the services,
supplies, materials, equipment or labor does not conform to requirements, or
if the public interest may otherwise be served thereby.
Sec. 18-1-11. Bonds of Bidders. Bonds with sufficient sureties and in such
amounts as shall be deemed adequate and approved by the board of county
commissioners, not only to insure performance of the contract or purchase
order in the time and manner prescribed, but also to save, indemnify, and
hold the county harmless against losses, damages, claims, liabilities,
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judgments, costs, and expenses which may accrue in consequence of the
granting or the contract or purchase order, shall be required of each bidder on
such contracts and purchase orders as involve amounts in excess of $5,000.00.
$5,000.00.
Sec 18-1-12. Assignment of Contracts. No contract awarded to the
lowest responsible bidder or to the highest responsible bidder, as the case
may be, shall be assignable by the successful bidder without the written
consent of the board of county commissioners. In no event shall a contract or
any part thereof be assigned to a bidder who is declared not to be a
responsible bidder in the consideration of bids submitted in response to
advertisement of the particular contract or purchase order.
Chapter 2
PURCHASING AGENT
Sections:
18-2-1.
18-2-2.
18-2-3.
18-2-4.
18-2-5.
18-2-6.
18-2-7.

Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond
Purchasing Agent — Powers and Duties
Revolving Fund
Purchasing Agent — Execution of Contracts
Contracts Executed in Violation of This Ordinance
Local Improvement Projects
-Penalty

See. 18*2-1. Purchasing Agent — Salary — Bond. The purchasing agent
shall perform or direct the performance of all such duties as are required by
the provisions of this chapter.* The salary for the purchasing agent shall be
fixed by the board of county commissioners which shall, in addition, require
the purchasing agent to post bond with adequate surety in an amount to be
determined by the commission and conditioned upon his faithful performance
of such duties as are here required.
See. 18-2-2. Purchasing Agent — Powers And Duties. The purchasing
agent shall:
(1) Recommend adoption, promulgation, and from time to time
revision, of the rules and regulations of the proper conduct of this office;
(2) Constitute the sole agent of the county in contracting for labor,
materials, or services, or for the purchase, lease, or sale of personal property,
materials, equipment or supplies, in conformity with the provisions of this
Title provided, however, that all contracts and purchase orders must be
submitted to the commission for approval and ratification as required by
section 17-5-74, UCA - 1953;
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